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A B S T R A C T
Under the Paris Agreement, countries committed to a variety of climate actions, including post-2020 greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets. This study compares projected GHG emissions in the G20 economies
under current climate policies to those under the GHG targets outlined in the nationally determined contribu-
tions (NDCs). It is based on an assessment of official governmental estimates and independent national and
global studies. The study concludes that six G20 members (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and Turkey)
are projected to meet their unconditional NDC targets with current policies. Eight members (Argentina,
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Republic of Korea, South Africa and the United States) require further
action to achieve their targets. Insufficient information is available for Saudi Arabia, and emission projections for
Brazil and Mexico are subject to considerable uncertainty. The study also presents high-level decarbonisation
indicators to better understand the current progress towards meeting the NDCs – Saudi Arabia and South Africa
were found to continue increasing both emission intensity per unit GDP and emissions per capita under current
policies by 2030 from 2015 levels.
1. Introduction
Now that the Paris Agreement has entered into force, governments
urgently need to increase ambition of post-2020 climate commitments
to ensure meeting the temperature goals outlined therein (Höhne et al.,
2017; Rogelj et al., 2016). The Paris Agreement aims to hold global
warming to well below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, while
pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2015a). In ad-
vance of the Paris meeting, almost all countries submitted national
post-2020 climate action plans and commitments, as part of their In-
tended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These commit-
ments are the foundation of the Paris Agreement. By 15 November
2017, 192 of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC, representing about 98% of
global 2012 emissions, had submitted their INDCs. Over 170 Parties
have ratified the agreement, thus turning their INDCs into NDCs. While
the current NDCs are projected to reduce warming relative to a no-
policy baseline scenario, even if they were fully implemented, their
combined mitigation impact would fall far short of what is required to
limit global warming to well below 2 °C, let alone 1.5 °C (Rogelj et al.,
2016).
NDCs are not static or one-off commitments; countries have the
obligation to strengthen them regularly, informed by progress assess-
ments that occur every five years under the Paris Agreement. That
process begins with the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue (now known as
“Talanoa Dialogue”), in which countries for the first time take stock of
their collective efforts towards meeting the Paris climate goals, and use
the assessment to inform the preparation of NDCs. In addition to the
collective assessment, the extent to which individual countries are
progressing towards achieving their NDCs/INDCs (hereafter referred to
as NDCs, unless mentioned in relation to a country that has not ratified
the Paris Agreement) is also pertinent to the preparation of future
NDCs, in that countries on track to meet or exceed their current
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commitments may be particularly well positioned to take on stronger
commitments.
There is also an increasing need for a consistent and harmonised
approach to track progress of countries towards their NDCs at different
levels of detail and taking into account different perspectives. A number
of assessment indicators and frameworks have been proposed in recent
years (Compston and Bailey, 2016; Höhne et al., 2018; Peters et al.,
2017).
This paper presents an updated assessment of the emissions asso-
ciated with the NDC targets and current policies of each of the G20
members (that is, the non-EU members of the G20 as well as the
European Union (EU28) as a whole – thus a total of 16). As these
economies are collectively responsible for around three quarters of
global GHG emissions, their success in implementing (or exceeding)
their NDCs will have a major impact on the achievement of the Paris
Agreement goals. To date, however, no peer-reviewed literature has
assessed the progress toward the NDC commitments of all G20 econo-
mies in a consistent manner. Independent, comparable analyses can
complement assessments conducted under the UNFCCC.
This study updates and expands on the work undertaken under the
2017 UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017) by updating emissions
projections of the current policy scenario from recently published Na-
tional Communications and Third Biennial Report for seven G20
members (Argentina, Australia, Canada, EU28, Japan, Russia and
Turkey) (UNFCCC, 2018b, 2018d), new and/or updated country-spe-
cific studies for seven G20 members (national models) and four global
model studies. In addition, this study describes the detailed metho-
dology underlying the analysis (Section 2), and compares NDCs and
current policy scenario projections by looking at commonly used high-
level decarbonisation indicators to provide further insights into the G20
members’ progress towards the NDC targets (Section 5). This study also
presents a discussion with the caveats and methodological limitations
(Section 6). Finally, conclusions and policy implications of this study
are drawn in Section 7.
2. Methodology
2.1. Scenario definition and data sources
To assess the progress of G20 members towards their NDC targets,
this study compares target-year emissions under each member's current
policies to those associated with the achievement of its NDC. For each
G20 member, estimates of emissions in the NDC target year (2025 or
2030) are compared for the following scenario groups:
2.1.1. NDC scenarios (unconditional and conditional)
Identifies the GHG emissions that each member could emit in the
target year (2025 for the US, 2030 for the other G20 members) under
the unconditional and, when available, conditional NDCs. Where
available, the emission levels reported by the national governments are
used as central estimates (UNFCCC, 2016); alternatively, the emission
levels are calculated from base-year or baseline data based on the NDCs
and on other official documents submitted by countries to the UNFCCC
(e.g. national GHG inventories, national communications, biennial re-
ports and biennial update reports) (Table 1 and Appendix A). Emission
level estimates published in the literature are also considered (if official
values were not available) (Table 1: independent sources).
2.1.2. Current policy scenario (official data)
Identifies the most recent, available official estimates of target year
emissions, accounting for the projected emission trends resulting from
current climate-, energy- and land-use policies. The sources of country
estimates from official documents are provided in Table 1. The mod-
elling base year of the current policy scenario projections differ across
reports.
2.1.3. Current policy scenario (independent studies)
Identifies emissions estimates for the target year, accounting for
emission projections resulting from the full implementation of current
policies based on independent studies. Emissions projections reviewed
here cover main energy and climate policies that were implemented by
a recent cut-off date (i.e., 2016 or 2017 depending on the studies) and
do not consider prospective policies that were still under consideration
or planning as of the cut-off date. Moreover, while studies differ in their
approaches for policy impact quantification, they do not automatically
assume that policy targets will be achieved when they are enshrined in
the form of a law or a strategy document – studies also consider the
status of policy implementation and the extent to which the policy plan
is supported by measures. Estimates were drawn from four global
model analyses: the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2018a), International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2017), Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous et al.,
2017), and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
(Kuramochi et al., 2017a; PBL, 2017; den Elzen et al., 2016). In addi-
tion, we also covered estimates published in a wide range of country-
specific sources using national models (Table 1). The independent
analysis of current policy trajectories supplements the official sources
described in Section 2.1.2 by providing data that targets consistency
across countries and political independence.
2.2. Evaluation of whether countries are on track to meet the NDC targets
Based on the emissions data collected as described in Section 2.1,
we assessed whether G20 members are on track to meet their NDC
targets. The following evaluation categories were defined: (i) on track,
(ii) further action needed, and (iii) uncertain or insufficient informa-
tion. The evaluation did not consider the potential use of offsets to
achieve the emissions reduction targets; it considered only national
emission trends.
We first evaluated whether a country would fall into the first two
categories, based on the number of independent studies that support
each of the evaluation categories. When the studies were inconclusive
or showed large ranges, we also assessed the average estimates of the
current policy scenario projections across all studies (median estimates
are used when more than five studies are available). The second eva-
luation category (‘further action needed’), was divided into two sub-
categories – ‘low additional effort’ denoting a current policy trajectory
(average estimate across studies) less than 15% lower than the
(average) unconditional NDC target, and ‘high additional effort’ de-
noting a current policy trajectory (average) more than 15% higher than
the unconditional NDC target.
The third evaluation category (‘uncertain or insufficient informa-
tion’) was applied when studies disagreed considerably on their current
policy scenario projections or when there was not enough information
to judge the countries’ progress towards their NDC targets.
2.3. Assessment of high-level decarbonisation indicators
The quantified emissions range for NDC targets and current policy
scenario projections were also assessed using a number of high-level
decarbonisation indicators that are frequently used in the context of
climate policy making. We considered IPAT1 and Kaya identity in-
dicators (Blanco et al., 2014): population, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita, and GHG emissions per unit of GDP, as well as GHG
emissions per capita to obtain further insights into the G20 members’
current effort levels and the mitigation contributions under the Paris
Agreement.
1 The IPAT identity, proposed by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) is described as:
Impact = Population * Affluence * Technology. The Kaya identity is "a special
case of the more general IPAT identity" and only considers CO2 emissions from
fuel combustion (Blanco et al., 2014).
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GDP and population projections underlying the NDCs and current
policy scenario projections were not always reported in the in-
dependent studies as well as the government documents covered in this
study; the reported underlying projections also differed considerably
across studies for some G20 members. Therefore, the GDP projections
were taken from the OECD GDP long-term forecast indicator, based on
the economic climate in individual countries, using a combination of
model-based analyses and expert judgement (OECD, 2018); population
projections were taken from the UN World Population Prospects
(medium fertility case) (UN, 2017). The use of an up-to-date, consistent
set of GDP and population projections, which consider the most recent
economic and demographic circumstances, from intergovernmental
organisations allows for an analytically robust and more politically
neutral assessment.
3. NDCs and emission trends of individual G20 members
To assess G20 members’ progress towards achieving their NDC
targets, this section compares current emissions trajectories with those
associated with the achievement of these members’ NDCs. Fig. 1 shows
the projected impact of the NDCs and current policies on target-year
GHG emissions for each of the 16 G20 members (with EU28 represented
collectively instead of by the four Member States, which are individual
G20 members), noting that for some countries and studies, data is not
always fully available. By comparing the current policy scenarios and
the NDC scenarios, the figure provides an indication of whether a
country needs to enhance or implement additional policies to meet its
NDC target.
Table 2 presents the evaluation results on whether G20 members are
on track to meet their unconditional NDCs. This section should be read
with three important caveats in mind. First, not all NDCs demand the
same level of effort to implement, so a country currently on track to
achieve its NDCs is undertaking more mitigation action than a country
not yet on track. It depends highly on the ambition level of the NDCs,
which this study does not assess, as well as on how strong the current
set of policies are. Second, these projections are subject to the un-
certainty associated with macroeconomic trends, such as gross domestic
product (GDP) and population growth, technology developments as
well as with the impact of policies. Section 6 discusses the caveats and
limitations of the methodology in more detail.
We conclude that a country (i) is on track or (ii) needs further action
based on the number of studies that support each of the evaluation
categories (Section 2.2). Following these criteria, recent studies suggest
that China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and Turkey are on track to
meet or overachieve their unconditional NDC targets through their
current policies within the level of uncertainty (Table 2). Argentina,
Australia, Canada, the EU28, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and
the United States require further action to meet their NDCs, according
Table 1
Studies used from official data and independent sources to estimate the emissions in the target year under the NDC and under current policies for G20 members.
Country NDC scenario Current policy scenario Current policy & NDC scenario
Official data sources Official data sources Independent sources (1. global models and 2. national models)
Argentina NDC - Government Argentina (2016)a Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable
Development Argentina (2015)b
1. CAT, JRC
Australia NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)c Government of Australia (2017) 1. CAT, JRC, PBL2. RepuTex (2016); Climate Works Australia (2018)
Brazil NDC (UNFCCC, 2016) N/A 1. CAT, JRC, PBL2. COPPE (Rochedo et al., 2018).
Canada NDC; Environment and Climate Change
Canada (2017)
Environment and Climate Change Canada
(2017)
1. CAT, JRC, PBL
China N/Ad N/A 1. CAT, IEAe, JRC, PBL2. ERI – updated (based on Jiang et al., 2013)f,
NCSC (Sha, 2018; Sha et al., 2017)f
EU28 NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)c EEA (2017); European Commission
(2016b, 2017); E3MLab and IIASA (2018)
1. CAT, JRC2. E3MLab (Fragkos et al., 2017)g
India N/Ad N/A 1. CAT, IEAe, JRC, PBL2. Mitra et al. (2017); IIMAe (Vishwanathan
and Garg, 2017); Energy Division, NITI Aayog, Government of India
(Dubash et al., 2018)
Indonesia NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)a N/A 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
Japan NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)c N/A 1. CAT, JRC, PBL2. AIM model (Spencer et al., 2015)
Mexico NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)a; Government of
Mexico (2015)a
N/A 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
Russia INDC (UNFCCC, 2015b)c Government of Russia (2015) 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
Saudi Arabia N/A: Saudi Arabia did not formulate a
post-2020 GHG target (UNFCCC, 2016)
N/A 1. CAT (based on KAUST, 2014), JRC
South Africa NDC (UNFCCC, 2016) Department of Environmental Affairs (2014) 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
Republic of Korea NDC (UNFCCC, 2016)a N/A 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
Turkey INDC (UNFCCC, 2015b)a Third Biennial Report (UNFCCC, 2018d) 1. CAT, JRC, PBL
United States NDC – U.S. Department of State (2016)c U.S. Department of State (2016) 1. CAT, JRC, PBL2. Chai et al. (2017); Iyer et al. (2017); Rhodium
Group (Larsen et al., 2018)
N/A: Not available.
a The 2030 emission level is calculated using the BAU scenario presented in the country's NDC.
b http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/argnc3s.pdf, see also inventory report: http://ambiente.gob.ar/wp-content/uploads/Inventario-GEIs-Argentina.xlsx.
c The 2030 target level of the emissions is calculated based on historical country's GHG emissions levels submitted via the Common Reporting Format 2017 (2016
inventory for the United States and Canada) to the UNFCCC after converting GWP values from those in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report to those in the IPCC
Second Assessment Report (SAR).
d There are no official estimates for the NDC projections available. Projections are based on country-specific studies and independent global analyses. The 2030
emission levels resulting from the NDC of China and India highly depend on the assumptions about future rates of GDP growth. Here the median estimate of
independent studies are used as described in Table 1, and in addition: University of Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2016), Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive,
2017), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) (Fawcett et al., 2015).
e Only CO2 emissions from energy, therefore augmented with CAT, JRC and PBL estimates to produce economy-wide projections.
f Augmented with the historical non-CO2 GHG emissions data from China's First Biennial Update Report on Climate Change (The People's Republic of China,
2017), combined with the median estimate of the 2010–2030 non-CO2 emissions growth rates for China from five integrated assessment models (Tavoni et al., 2015),
to produce economy-wide figures.
g The current policy scenario is based on the EU reference scenario 2016 (European Commission, 2016b).
M. den Elzen et al. Energy Policy 126 (2019) 238–250
240
Fig. 1. Greenhouse gas emissions of the G20 members in the
target year (2030, except for the USA: 2025) for current
policy scenario from official data sources (fourth bar) and
from official and independent sources (fifth bar), and un-
conditional and conditional NDC scenarios (sixth and seventh
bar) from all data sources. Bars show the average estimate
across studies (median estimate is used if more than five
studies are available) of each range (official values are used
for NDC scenarios when available). For current-policy and
NDC scenarios, the 10th–90th-percentile ranges across all
studies are provided, except if the number of studies is three
or lower than the minimum–maximum ranges are used
(Table 1). The historical emissions for 1990, 2010 and 2015,
shown as first three bars, are described in Appendix A. For
reporting reasons, the emissions projections for China, EU,
India and United States are shown in panel (a), and the other
countries in panel (b), with different horizontal axes. Note: *
For the US, the unconditional NDC and current policies is for
2025. South Africa's NDC is based on an emission trajectory
with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e. Source: based
on Figure 3.3a and 3.3b of UNEP (2017), with updated
emission projections from official and independent data
sources and updated historical emissions data (up to 2015).
Table 2
Progress towards achieving the unconditional NDC targets for the G20 economies (methodology explained in text) in the target year (2030, except for the USA:
2025). The number of studies that support the finding (on track, further action needed and uncertain) are compared to the available studies, as indicated between
brackets.
On track Further action needed Uncertain or insufficient information
Low additional efforta High additional effortb
• China (5 of 6 studies)• India (7 of 7 studies)• Indonesia (2 of 3 studies)• Japan (3 of 4 studies)• Russia* (4 of 4 studies)• Turkey* (3 of 4 studies)
• Argentina (2 of 3 studies)• EU28 (6 of 6 studies)c • Australia (5 of 5 studies)• Canada (4 of 4 studies)• South Africa (4 of 4 studies)• Republic of Korea (4 of 4 studies)• United States (2025) (7 of 7 studies)
• Brazil (studies disagree)d• Mexico (studies disagree)d• Saudi Arabia (insufficient information, 2 studies disagree)
* denotes if the average estimate of the current policy scenario projections across all studies (median estimates are used when more than five studies are available)
in 2030 is more than 10% lower than the average 2030 NDC target.
a Low additional effort denotes if the average estimate (across all studies) of the current policy trajectory is less than 15% lower than the (average) unconditional
NDC target.
b High additional effort denotes if the average estimate (across all studies) of the current policy trajectory is more than 15% higher than the average unconditional
NDC target.
c The impact of the recently adopted revisions of ETS and 2030 goals of renewable energy and energy savings are not included in these three studies (See EU
section).
d Two of the four studies for Brazil and Mexico show on track, but two other studies show not on track.
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to government and independent estimates. In particular, Australia,
Canada, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the United States need
a high additional effort (current policy trajectory more than 15% above
the unconditional NDC target. From existing studies, it is not possible to
determine whether Brazil and Mexico are on track to meet their NDCs,
as about half of the studies indicate they are on track, but the remaining
studies find the opposite. For Turkey, most studies agree that it is on
track to meet its NDC, but also indicate a wide range of projections
(Fig. 1). For Saudi Arabia, there is insufficient information to judge
progress towards its NDC, because an official projection reflecting
current policies is unavailable and it has not published the baseline
corresponding to its NDC target.
In addition to unconditional targets, four G20 economies have
communicated conditional targets in their NDCs – Argentina, Indonesia
and Mexico are not on track to meet their conditional NDC target,
whereas India is on track to meet its conditional NDC target.
Fig. 1 furthermore illustrates that progress on reducing absolute
GHG emissions varies across the G20 members. (Some NDC targets
allow absolute emissions to grow.) For nine of the 16 G20 members
(Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa and Turkey), emissions would continue increasing
through 2030 under current policies. Annual emissions in the other
members are projected to remain stable at around 2010 levels (in-
cluding in Australia, Brazil, Russia and the United States), or to de-
crease further (such as in the EU28, Japan and Canada), under current
policies.
The following section provides more detail on each of the G20
members, starting with the four highest-emitting economies, China,
EU28, India and the United States.
China's NDC includes three major mitigation targets: (1) to peak
CO2 emissions around 2030, making best efforts to peak earlier, (2) to
reduce the carbon intensity of its GDP by 60–65% from 2005 levels by
2030, (3) to achieve 20% share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy
consumption by 2030. These targets address only energy-related carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions. China also pledges to increase the forest stock
volume by around 4.5 billion m3 from 2005 levels by 2030. An official
estimate of the 2030 emissions associated with the NDC targets is not
available. However, two national estimates for CO2 emissions from the
energy sector (and cement) are available from National Center for
Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC) (Sha,
2018; Sha et al., 2017) and Energy Research Institute (ERI) (updated
calculations based on Jiang et al., 2013). These were augmented with
the historical non-CO2 GHG emissions (The People's Republic of China,
2017), and non-CO2 emission growth rates (Tavoni et al., 2015), to
produce GHG emission projections. Independent studies (CAT, 2018a;
IEA, 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017a) estimated China's emissions under
national policies from China's 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP) and 13th FYP
for Renewable Development (including renewable capacity targets and
a cap on coal consumption). These studies suggest that China's 2030
emissions will fall below the emission levels calculated from the full
implementation of the NDC targets, although there is significant range
in emission projections. Total GHG emissions are projected to keep
growing up to 2030, albeit at a lower rate than the historical
(2000–2012) emissions, which is also concluded in the analysis of Jiang
et al. (2017). Many studies included here have revised their projections
downwards compared to their previous projections, but only a few
studies indicate that CO2 emissions will peak before 2030 (Climate
Action Tracker – lower end; (Green and Stern, 2017)). Driven by air
pollution control policies (State Council, 2013), China started to reduce
coal use and promote clean energy use in 2012. Together with struc-
tural changes, i.e. shifting its economy away from heavy industry to
services, this resulted in a slowdown of most energy-intensive produc-
tion, a peak in coal consumption in 2013, and continued decline from
2014. In the last two years, new installed capacity of wind power, solar
power, and hydropower has increased to more than 120 GW. However,
increases in coal use increased again in 2017, which would reverse part
of their decreases since 2013 (Le Quéré et al., 2017) and energy related
CO2 emissions are estimated to have reached a new all-time high in
2017 (IEA, 2018).
The EU28's NDC contains a commitment of at least a 40% reduction
in domestic emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. The studies of
Kuramochi et al. (2017a), JRC (Kitous et al., 2017), the EEA Trends
report (European Environment Agency, 2017) and the EU Reference
Scenario 2016 (European Commission, 2016b), E3MLab and IIASA
(2018) and Fragkos et al. (2017) and Seventh National Communication
(European Commission, 2017) suggest that the EU28 will fall short of
its NDC target under current policies. E3MLab and IIASA (2018) and
Fragkos et al. (2017) also developed policy scenarios based on the EU
Reference Scenario 2016, and designed to achieve the 2030 targets of
the 2030 Climate & Energy Framework2 (NDC target, binding renew-
able target, energy efficiency target). European climate policy can be
classified into two categories: (1) the EU Emission Trading System (EU
ETS), the EU-wide cap-and-trade system covering electricity genera-
tion, energy-intensive industry and aviation, and (2) policies targeting
non-ETS sectors, such as transport, agriculture and buildings, including
Member State-specific targets for emission reduction captured by the
Effort Sharing Decision (2013–2020). To reach the NDC target, both
policy pillars need to be strengthened for the period 2021–2030. The
EU is in the process of adopting a large package of measures (Clean
Energy for All Europeans3) aiming to accelerate GHG emissions re-
ductions in different areas. The impact of these adopted policies is not
included in the analysis of the studies cited above because they have not
been adopted by the European Council; the adoption is expected to
follow.3 More specifically, a revision of the EU ETS for the period from
2021 to 2030 was adopted in March 2018, which encompasses three
key elements: reducing the cap at an annual rate of 2.2%, from 2021
onwards; doubling the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) feeding rate
between 2019 and 2023 to reduce surplus of allowances; and in-
validating allowances in the MSR exceeding the number of allowances
auctioned in the previous year, from 2023 onwards (Council of the
European Union, 2017b). This binding cap measure contributes to
achieving the planned 2030 reductions for the ETS sector (43% re-
duction below 2005) (European Commission, 2015). The provisionally
agreed Effort Sharing Regulation applying to GHG emissions from
sectors not covered by EU ETS, i.e. transport, buildings, agriculture and
waste management, was adopted in May 2018. The overall targeted
GHG emission reduction from these sectors is 30% by 2030, relative to
2005, to be achieved by legally binding annual emission limits for each
Member State for the years 2021–2030 (Council of the European Union,
2017c; European Commission, 2016b). There is also the adopted reg-
ulation to integrate GHG emissions and removals from land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) into the 2030 climate and energy
framework (European Parliament 2018), an adopted proposal for
amending the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Energy Performance
of Buildings Directive (Council of the European Union, 2017a;
European Commission, 2016a). In 2018, the Energy Union Governance
Regulation was agreed, which sets out interim targets towards
achieving the 2030 goals of 32% renewable energy and 32.5% energy
savings. The European Commission anticipates that emission reductions
would go beyond 40% below 1990 in 2030, if these new targets are
met.4
India's NDC commits to, by 2030, reducing its emissions intensity of
GDP, excluding the agriculture sector, by 33–35% below 2005 levels,
increasing the share of non-fossil energy in total power generation ca-
pacity to 40% (with the help of transfer of technology and low cost
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sink of 2.5–3 GtCO2e through additional forest and tree cover. The main
mitigation-related policies implemented in India include the market-
based mechanism Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme for energy
efficiency initiatives in energy-intensive sectors of the economy, re-
newable energy capacity targets, Clean Environment Cess (coal tax) and
a range of support schemes laid out under the 12th Five Year Plan. In
Fig. 1, the NDC projections of independent studies labelled “uncondi-
tional” assume either current policies or only the intensity target, while
NDC projection labelled “conditional” assume full implementation of
the NDC targets, including the non-fossil fuel target. Independent stu-
dies (CAT, 2018a; Dubash et al., 2018; IEA, 2017; Mitra et al., 2017;
PBL, 2017; Vishwanathan and Garg, 2017) project that India will re-
duce emissions farther than required by the intensity target with cur-
rent policies, but it is uncertain what emission level would be reached
under all three targets combined, also because emission projections
highly depend on future economic growth (e.g, Dubash et al., 2018).
In 2018 the National Electricity Plan was published (CEA, 2018).
The NEP indicates that while 48.3 GW of end-of-life plants are expected
to close by 2022, another 94.3 GW will be added by 2027. There is a
risk, however, of at least some of this capacity becoming stranded as-
sets. The projections in the National Electricity Plan is in stark contrast
to its draft version (Central Electricity Authority, 2016), which forecast
that no new coal-fired power capacity would be required during the
period 2022–2027 following a capacity addition of around 50 GW for
the period 2017–2022.
The NDC communicated by the United States in 2016 committed to
reduce GHG emissions by 26–28% below 2005 levels in 2025.
Independent studies (Table 1) indicate that the U.S. is not on track to
meet the 2025 NDC targets with existing policies (excluding the Clean
Power Plan). In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced that
the U.S. intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and would cease
implementation of the NDC. On August 4th, 2017, the US notified the
UN Secretary General that it intends to “exercise its right to withdraw”
from the Paris Agreement. The earliest that U.S. withdrawal can take
effect is in 2020, four years after the Paris Agreement entered into
force. Legally, the US NDC is still in place until that time, although the
Trump Administration has made clear that the target will not be im-
plemented at the federal level. Fransen and Levin (2017) analysed
seven studies (Chai et al., 2017; Climate Action Tracker, 2017; Climate
Advisers, 2017; ClimateInteractive, 2017; Hafstead, 2017; Rhodium
Group, 2017a; b) and estimated that 2025 emissions under the new
Administration's policies will range from 5.6 to 6.8 GtCO2e/year, in
contrast to 5.0–6.6 GtCO2e/year under the previous Administration's
policies. All these scenarios show emissions in 2025 higher than the
U.S. target. However, these projections highly depend on how quickly
policies are reversed or revised, and what will replace them. In addi-
tion, many states, cities and companies have stepped up in response to
Trump's announcement on the Paris Agreement, pledging to support the
agreement and to take action on climate change. The additional impact
of action by these subnational and non-state actors, however, may
counter some of the effect of the new Administration's policies (Data
Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute, PBL, 2018; Kuramochi et al.,
2017b).
Argentina presented a revised and more ambitious NDC relative to
its INDC (Government of Argentina, 2016). This new NDC includes an
unconditional absolute emissions target of 483 MtCO2e/year by 2030
and a conditional target of 369 MtCO2e/year by 2030, both including
land use land use change and forestry emissions (LULUCF). The lower
emission projections resulting from the revised NDC is partly due to the
updated methodologies for quantifying the historical emissions data in
the land use sector. The Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2018a) concludes
that under current policies the emissions projections would still rise
significantly by about 50% above 2010 levels, and Argentina would
need to implement additional mitigation actions to meet its revised
NDC targets.
Australia committed to a 26–28% reduction of GHG emissions by
2030 below 2005 levels, including LULUCF. Official projections in-
dicate that emissions are expected to reach 570 MtCO2e/year in 2030
(Government of Australia, 2017), in contrast to the NDC projections of
429–440MtCO2e/year. Independent analyses (CAT, 2018a; Kitous
et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017a; Reputex, 2016) confirm that
Australia's emissions under current policies are expected to fall short of
achieving its NDC targets for 2030. The main policies include the
Emissions Reduction Fund and linked safeguard mechanisms, which the
Government of Australia considers to be a key policy measure, and the
National Energy Productivity Plan that aims to improve energy pro-
ductivity by 40% by 2030.
Brazil has put forward an absolute emissions target of 1.3 GtCO2e/
year by 2025 and an indicative target of 1.2 GtCO2e/year by 2030,
which are equivalent to 37% and 43% below 2005 emissions levels
including LULUCF. Actions to achieve the targets focus mainly on the
forest sector and on increasing the share of biofuels and renewable
electricity in the Brazilian energy mix. Two independent studies (PBL
and JRC) suggest that if all implemented policies are successful (in-
cluding the enforcement of the Brazilian Forest Code, biofuel policy
updates and renewable power capacity targets) emission projections are
likely to be in line with the NDC targets; however, two other studies
(CAT, 2018a; Rochedo et al., 2018) project higher emissions, taking
into account the recent reversal in progress towards reducing defor-
estation, and show the opposite. Uncertainty nevertheless remains
about the future of emissions. For example, LULUCF emissions were
reduced by 86% between 2005 and 2012 through successful policies in
the LULUCF sector, i.e. the enforcement of the Brazilian Forest Code
and efforts to reduce deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado regions
(Ministry of Science and Technology of Brazil, 2016), but recent data
and analyses suggest that the decreasing trend in deforestation has
slowed down or even stopped (SEEG, 2017). In fact, the recent political
crisis in the country has forced government to concede reversals in
environmental regulation in exchange for political support, which
could potentially result in higher deforestation emissions (Rochedo
et al., 2018).
Canada's NDC commits to emissions reductions of 30% from the
2005 level by 2030. Government projections indicate that emissions are
expected to reach 742 MtCO2e/year by 2030, in contrast to the targeted
level of 523 MtCO2e/year (excluding LULUCF) (Environment and
Climate Change Canada, 2017). The main current policies are a fuel
efficiency standard for passenger vehicles and carbon standard for
newly built coal-fired power plants. Independent studies show that
Canada is not achieving its NDC target under current policies by a large
margin. Canada has recently proposed a plan to price carbon pollution
that would require individual provinces either to place a direct price on
carbon or to adopt a cap and trade system. This planned policy was not
included in the analysis.
Indonesia's NDC includes an unconditional target of 29% below
BAU and a conditional 41% reduction below BAU with sufficient in-
ternational support by 2030, both including LULUCF. A significant
share of Indonesia's emissions originates in the LULUCF sector, due to
deforestation, peatland destruction, and land-use change. GHG emis-
sions from LULUCF are expected to increase over time, driven by con-
tinued expansion of large scale oil palm plantations, but there are large
uncertainties in the emission projections. Independent analyses covered
in Table 1 show that Indonesia is close to on track to achieving its
unconditional NDC, with overall GHG emissions showing an increase
compared to 2010 levels.
Japan aims to reduce its GHG emissions by 26% below 2013 levels
by 2030 under its NDC. Recent independent analyses show that Japan is
roughly on track to meet its NDC with current policies (such as the
renewable feed-in tariff scheme and the 2014 Basic Energy Plan).
Japan's NDC also sets a power generation mix target, with 26% coal,
27% gas, 20–22% nuclear and 22–24% renewables. However, there is
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still a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future role of nuclear and
coal power, as it is not yet fully clear when nuclear capacity will be
replaced and by which energy carriers.
Mexico in its NDC aims to reduce its GHG emissions by between
22% (unconditional) and 36% (conditional) from BAU by 2030. Mexico
has also set a goal of generating 35% of its electricity from clean energy
sources5 by 2024. Mexico's new Energy Transition Law provides over-
arching strategies and goals with regard to clean energy, energy effi-
ciency and GHG emissions reductions (Government of Mexico, 2015).
Under current policies, Mexico is roughly on track to meet the un-
conditional NDC target, but additional mitigation actions are needed to
meet the conditional NDC target (Kuramochi et al., 2017a).
Republic of Korea committed under its NDC to reduce its GHG
emissions by 37% below BAU by 2030. Recent independent analyses
indicated that the emissions projections under current policies would
exceed the NDC emission level. Main current policies considered here
are renewable energy targets for 2020 and 2030 and the national
emissions trading system (ETS). The Roadmap to Achieve the National
GHG reduction target for 2030 has been published in 2016, which
specifies the emissions projections, reduction targets and major emis-
sions reduction plans for eight sectors (The Government of the Republic
of Korea, 2017).
The new government that took office in May 2017 announced plans
to implement new policies to increase renewable electricity and reduce
reliance on coal power. Following this, a new 15-year “Plan for
Electricity Supply and Demand” was released, which confirms the in-
tention to shift electricity generation away from coal and nuclear to-
wards more renewables (CAT, 2018b; Ministry of Trade Industry and
Energy, 2018). CAT (2018a) estimates that such policies could bring
Republic of Korea considerably close to meeting its NDC.
Russia's INDC aims to limit its GHG emissions to 70–75% of 1990
levels by 2030. Independent estimates of the INDC emission level vary
significantly, mainly due to different interpretations of the accounting
of LULUCF emissions. The projected emission levels under current po-
licies in 2030 are below the lower end of Russia's INDC range.
Saudi Arabia's NDC aims to achieve emission reductions of up to 130
MtCO2e annually by 2030 through actions and plans that also contribute to
economic diversification and adaptation. The country has not yet defined a
baseline, which the NDC states will be determined based on weighted
combinations of two scenarios, which differ in terms of their assumptions
regarding the allocation of oil: produced for either domestic consumption or
export. The independent studies (JRC and CAT) project that Saudi Arabia is
not on track to meet its NDC target. Given the uncertainties around the NDC
target and the lack of data availability we conclude that it is not possible to
determine whether Saudi Arabia is on track.
South Africa's NDC consists of a ‘peak, plateau and decline’ GHG
emissions trajectory, which gives a range of 398–614 MtCO2e/year
between 2025 and 2030, reaching a peak between 2020 and 2025 and a
plateau for the following decade, before starting to fall. The current
policies projection includes the Integrated Resource Plan for electricity,
the most important policy affecting South Africa's GHG emissions. All
studies agree that South Africa's GHG emissions under current policies
are above the NDC emissions range by a margin of 50 MtCO2e/year to
nearly 400 MtCO2e/year in 2030.
Turkey's INDC sets an economy-wide GHG emission reduction
target of up to 21% below BAU by 2030 (about 900 MtCO2e/year). The
current policies projection includes renewable energy targets. The in-
dependent studies show a wide range of emissions projections
(525–1000 MtCO2e/year). This large range means the INDC could be
either easily achieved (based on the emissions projections under current
policies by PBL and JRC), or expected to be achieved (based on gov-
ernment estimates reflected in the projection of CAT, 2018a).
4. Understanding the required reduction efforts of the G20
members collectively
Our assessment indicates that current policies of G20 members
collectively fall short of achieving the unconditional NDCs (Table 3).
G20 economies will likely need to implement additional policies to
together reduce further 2030 GHG emissions by about 2.5 GtCO2e to
achieve all the unconditional NDCs, and by about 3.5 GtCO2e to achieve
all the conditional NDCs.
Fig. 2 presents the additional effort needed, and shows that the main
contributions would need to come from Australia, Canada, the Republic
of Korea, South Africa and in particular the United States. These four
countries also have the largest additional reduction effort as a percen-
tage of the current policies estimates (between 20% and 25%). For the
United States, linear interpolation between the NDC target year (2025)
and the 2050 long-term target (83% reduction below 2005 levels) was
assumed to estimate the 2030 target —it should be noted that the re-
quired additional emissions reductions would halve if the 2030 target
remained at the same level as for 2025, instead of progressing linearly
towards its 2050 target as assumed in our analysis (and in many studies
assessed in Rogelj et al. (2016) and UNEP (2017) for the global NDC
scenarios). In addition, emission target levels of three NDCs (India,
Russia and Turkey) are projected to be above the estimated current
policy scenario levels, as illustrated in Fig. 2. These countries are thus
expected to overachieve their NDC targets under their current policies
by about 1 GtCO2e. For the gap mentioned above, we have not assumed
that his overachievement offsets the underachievement of other targets
and assumed that these countries will follow their current policies
trajectory rather than that implied by their NDCs.
We also compared 2030 emissions for the G20 under current po-
licies and NDCs with those based on 2 °C pathways. The 2030 emissions
levels the G20 for the 2 °C pathways are calculated based on the ag-
gregated greenhouse gas emissions levels of all individual G20 members
projected (median estimate) by 450 ppm CO2e scenarios (van Soest
et al., 2017). The delayed 450 ppm CO2e scenarios are based on global
emission scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models from various
projects, such as: AMPERE (Kriegler et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2015) and
LIMITS (Tavoni et al., 2015), that assume limited action until 2020 and
global least-cost emission reduction pathways starting from 2020 and
consistent with a greater than 66% chance of limiting global warming
in 2100 to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. The G20 emission
levels in 2030 for 2 °C pathways are estimated at 27 (range: 23–31)
GtCO2e (about 20% below 2010 levels), which is about 13.5 GtCO2e
lower than the median estimate for the current policies (about 40.5
GtCO2e, or 8% above 2010 levels).
5. Understanding the mitigation efforts of the NDCs
The previous sections assessed whether G20 members, individually
and collectively, need to implement additional policies to meet their
NDC targets. This section presents high-level decarbonisation indicators
to enhance understanding of the progress of G20 economies toward
their NDCs. This is done by examining changes in these indicators re-
lative to 2010, and decoupling of emissions in terms of population and
GDP on the basis of a few indicators that have been proposed in the
literature (Peters et al., 2017). We do not attempt to indicate the level
of ambition of the NDC targets. Assessing whether the magnitude of
change in GHG emission-related indicators as a result of NDCs is am-
bitious and fair in the light of Paris Agreement's long-term goal requires
explicit benchmarking across alternative normative indicators of effort-
sharing, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, a number of
recent peer-reviewed studies attempt this task using a range of effort-
sharing allocations according to different equity principles (CAT,
2018a; Höhne et al., 2018; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al.,
2017), using similar IPCC AR5 effort-sharing categories (Höhne et al.,
2014).
5 Includes renewables, nuclear, carbon capture and storage-equipped fossil
fuel power as well as efficient combined heat and power.
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Cross-cutting information regarding national emissions (relative to
various base years), emissions per GDP and emissions per capita for G20
economies is summarised in Fig. 3. The projections of the latter two
indicators are influenced by many factors. The per capita GDP and
population growth will generally result in an increase in emissions,
while energy intensity improvements in the global economy and re-
ductions of carbon intensity in energy production will generally result
in a decrease in emissions.
Fig. 3a illustrates the wide range of likely per capita emissions in
2030. It also illustrates a general trend that countries starting from a
lower base level in 2015 tend to increase more by 2030. For example,
Australia and Canada, with high expected 2030 per capita emissions,
are among those (including the EU28) with the highest decline relative
to 2015 for the current policy scenario. Argentina, Russia and Saudi
Arabia show an increase in per capita emissions despite having a high
expected per capita emission level in 2030. Saudi Arabia has the highest
expected per capita emissions in 2030, reaching almost eight times the
per capita emission levels of India, and four times those of the EU28.
India, with low levels of per capita emissions in 2015, has the highest
increase in per capita emissions relative to 2015, together with Ar-
gentina and Turkey.
Fig. 3b illustrates the change in emissions by 2030 compared to
2015 levels. Current policies do not prevent emissions from increasing
from 2015 to 2030 for 12 of the 16 G20 economies. The highest de-
crease compared to 2015 levels are in the EU28 and Brazil, whereas
India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia shows the highest increases. It indicates
that the various G20 economies have had different phases of rapid
emissions increase.
Fig. 3c shows the emissions intensity of the GDP, expressing the
extent to which current policies lead to a decoupling of economic
growth and emissions. In total, decoupling is projected to be about
20–40% for 12 of the 16 G20 economies. Only Turkey and Russia have a
below 5% and 1% decrease in emissions per GDP, and for Saudi Arabia
and South Africa it is an increase of about 15% and 2% (see Fig. 3c).
The largest reductions are projected for countries with the highest
emission intensities in 2015, such as China and EU28.
Fig. 3a and Fig. 3c combined show that Saudi Arabia and South
Africa are projected to continue increasing both emission intensity per
unit GDP and emissions per capita under current policies by 2030 from
2015 levels. Together with Russia, which showed little change in
emission intensity per unit GDP, these major fossil fuel-producing
countries are projected to continue with the current economic structure
at least up to 2030.
Fig. 3d shows the change in IPAT/Kaya indicators (emissions, po-
pulation, GDP per capita and emissions intensity) by 2030 compared to
2015 levels for the current policies. The per capita GDP and population
growth (in particular for China, India and Indonesia) result in an in-
crease in emissions, while decrease in emission intensity of GDP lowers
the emissions. However, for many G20 economies this lowering effect is
not enough to prevent emissions from increasing from 2015 to 2030
under current policies.
6. Discussion
6.1. Interpretation of the results
Regarding the findings of this study, a country being on track to
meet its NDC does not necessarily mean that it will undertake more
stringent action on mitigation than a country that is not on track. We
identified three main reasons for this.
First, the NDC targets differ in their ambition levels. A country that
is not on track to meet its NDC target may have set itself a very am-
bitious target or a country being on track to meet its target may indicate
that it set a relatively unambitious target. A number of recent studies
have analysed the level of ambition and fairness of the NDC targets
using a range of effort-sharing allocations according to different metrics
and equity principles (CAT, 2018a; Höhne et al., 2018; Pan et al., 2017;
Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). In addition, NDCs are also nationally
determined and heterogeneous by nature, so a fair comparison of pro-
gress across countries is not always straightforward.
Second, the current policy scenario projections presented in this
study only account for existing policies at least through 2016, and thus
our findings should not be interpreted as the likelihood of countries’
meeting their NDC targets. It has only been three years since countries
formulated their NDCs. It is not surprising to see a gap between the
mitigation targets and current policy trajectories if countries pledged
something above what they would have achieved anyway. The gap may
close in the years to come as countries adopt additional policies and
strengthen the implementation of existing policies.
Third, countries have different policy-making approaches. Some
countries use their pledges or targets as a device to drive more ambi-
tious policies, while others use them merely to formalise the expected
effect of existing measures.
Table 3
Total greenhouse gas emissions for the G20 as a group in 2030 (GtCO2e/year)
under different scenarios (average and 10th to 90th percentile range).
Scenario G20 total emissions in
2030a
Current policy 40.5 (35.5–46.0)
Unconditional NDCs 38.0 (36.0–39.0)
Conditional NDCs 37.0 (35.0–39.0)
G20 emission level based on 2 °C pathways (more
than 66% chance of meeting 2 °C in 2100, global
least-cost from 2020)b
27.0 (23.5–31.5)
a G20 emissions in 2010 and 2015 were 32.0 and 35.2 GtCO2e, respectively
(Appendix A).
b the emission projections of individual G20 members are based on the cost-
optimal 450 ppm CO2e scenarios, as described in van Soest et al. (2017).
Fig. 2. Projected emission reduction (GtCO2e/year) relative to the current policy scenario to achieve NDC targets in G20 members in 2030. (Calculation for USA
based on extrapolated indicative 2030 target.).
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6.2. Methodological limitations
There are some important methodological limitations related to the
reported emission levels from the current policies and the full im-
plementation of the NDCs, which are largely attributable to the un-
certainties surrounding these emissions projections resulting from cur-
rent policies, the differences in the nature and characteristics of NDCs
and climate policies across countries.
First, and arguably most importantly, projections are subject to
uncertainty associated with factors including macroeconomic trends,
such as changes in GDP and population trends, and the future techno-
logical development, as well as the impact of each country's climate
policy action. This information is provided in this study as a range of
projections from different models and literature sources (Table 1),
which consider the best current estimates of projected economic trends
and current policy approaches, including policies at least through 2016.
The ranges do not reflect the full uncertainty range associated with the
aforementioned factors. This would require a systematic analysis of the
impact of the key uncertainties, including such socioeconomic condi-
tions, on the current policies emission trajectories at a country level,
which is not available in the current literature. Rogelj et al. (2017) have
done such a systematic uncertainty analysis for the emissions outcomes
of NDCs, and found that uncertainties in socioeconomic developments
are the dominant driver, accounting for more than half of the un-
certainty. (Part of this uncertainty results from some NDCs being ex-
pressed as emissions intensity improvements.)
Fig. 3. Per capita greenhouse gas emissions for the unconditional NDCs and current policy scenario for G20 members (a), emissions relative to 2015 levels (b),
emission intensity of the economy (i.e. emissions per unit of real GDP (US$2010)) (c), and their drivers, population, GDP per capita and emission intensity (current
policies), based on the Kaya decomposition (d) for the year 2030 (current policies). Bars show the median estimate, with the median emission estimates as shown in
Fig. 1. Note: South Africa's NDC is based on an emission trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e.
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Second, besides the impact of socioeconomic factors on quantifying
NDC target emission levels, there is also an uncertainty in the NDC
target emission levels when the NDCs include non-GHG targets such as
energy mix targets or forest sink targets, as observed for China and
India. A relatively large number of assumptions have to be made to
translate such targets into GHG emission terms, as well as to assess
whether these non-GHG targets result in additional emissions reduc-
tions beyond the GHG emission targets also set under their NDCs.
Third, interpretation and coverage of current policies may differ
between studies. Current policy trajectories reflect all adopted and
implemented policies, which for the purpose of this report are defined
as legislative decisions, executive orders, or their equivalent. This im-
plies that publicly announced plans or strategies alone would not
qualify, while individual executive orders to implement such plans or
strategies would qualify. Ultimately, however, these definitions may be
interpreted differently in the underlying studies. In addition, studies
may differ in the coverage of effective national climate and energy
policies, and/or translation of policies to model parameters is done
differently because of model structure. This assessment is bound by the
interpretations and coverage of policies as used by individual research
groups.
Fourth, countries are implementing policies in various areas to a
varying degree; the stringency of a current policy package considerably
differs across countries. With regard to the coverage of key policy areas,
for example Höhne et al. (2018) show that the EU and the US cover
more sectors and thematic areas with policies that are considered to be
good practice for reducing GHG emissions than China does. With regard
to policy implementation, we provide an example of renewable energy
targets, which have been set by many countries and are to be achieved
by national support policies. For some countries, in particular the non-
OECD countries, there is not enough information about the im-
plementation status. For some countries, the studies have assumed a full
implementation of those targets without limited evidence of concrete
support policies, in some cases by considering other factors (e.g. his-
torical trends and projections from other studies), but this has the risk
of overestimating the emissions reductions. Although beyond our re-
search scope, it is important to assess and compare the stringency and
comprehensiveness of the existing policy package in future work.
7. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we analysed the G20 members’ progress towards the
greenhouse emissions targets outlined in their nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. The assessment shows
that for many G20 economies, NDC implementation would result in
lower emissions than the current policy scenario, or in other words, that
additional policies will have to be implemented to meet the NDC target
(barring the use of offsets or unpredicted macroeconomic shifts, as
mentioned above). For other countries, the NDC target emission levels
were found to be above current policy scenario projections. (We do not
assess the ambition levels of NDC targets; this could be done by ap-
plying different equity-based effort sharing approaches to global
emission pathways consistent with achieving 2 °C or 1.5 °C.)
After careful consideration of the caveats and limitations described
in Section 6, we come to the following conclusions. Altogether, recent
studies assessed here suggest that six G20 members (China, India, In-
donesia, Japan, Russia and Turkey) are on track to achieve or over-
achieve their unconditional 2030 targets under current policies.
Uncertainty about the future emissions projections makes it difficult
to determine whether Brazil, Mexico and Saudi Arabia are on track to
meet their NDCs. Better data and more national studies are necessary to
track progress adequately. The number of studies analysing whether
countries are on track to achieve their NDC targets is still limited in
literature, whereas from a policy perspective it becomes more and more
important to look at the implementation of the NDCs.
The seven remaining G20 economies (Argentina, Australia, Canada,
EU28, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the United States) need to
adopt enhanced and new climate and energy policies as their projected
reductions by the target year fall short of meeting the reductions tar-
geted in their NDCs, according to government and independent esti-
mates. These policies could focus on further decarbonisation of energy
supply and the improvement of energy efficiency (such as increasing
energy efficiency in the industry, buildings and transport sectors, in-
creasing investments in renewable energy technologies and reducing
the use of coal), and/or mitigation in the non-energy sector (such as
afforestation, reducing methane emissions arising from oil and gas
production and reducing hydrofluorocarbon or HFC emissions).
Many countries (including G20 economies) have already success-
fully implemented a wide range of climate and energy policies (such as
renewable energy, efficiency standards in transport and appliances,
afforestation and reforestation) that reduce greenhouse gas emissions
(e.g., Fekete et al., 2015; Roelfsema et al., 2018). G20 economies could
adopt or strengthen these policies, as relevant, as they already have
proven to be successful today at reasonable costs. This would help them
to meet or go beyond their current commitments.
Some of the economies that are not on track based on our results are
planning to implement new measures (like the reform of the ETS for the
EU28, the Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand for the Republic of
Korea), which once implemented, would further reduce future emis-
sions.
Progress on reducing GHG emissions relative to historical levels also
varies for the G20 economies. Current policies are projected to impact
emissions, but do not prevent emissions from continuing to increase
through 2030 (above 2010 levels). This is the case in many G20
economies (Argentina, Australia, China, India, Mexico, Republic of
Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey). Emissions under current
policies in the remaining G20 economies are projected to remain stable,
approximately at current levels, or to decrease.
The per capita emission projections under current policies also show
a wide range across G20 economies, with the highest per capita emis-
sions in 2030 for Saudi Arabia, Australia, Argentina, the United States
and Canada. For many G20 economies there is a decoupling of eco-
nomic growth and greenhouse gas emissions under current policies,
except for Saudi Arabia and South Africa, and to a lower extent Russia.
In general, differences in per capita emissions and emission intensity
start to decrease (with some exceptions), but these levels are still well
above the global average level needed to be compatible with the Paris
Agreement temperature goals of 1.5 °C or 2 °C.
For meeting the climate objectives of the Paris Agreement, it is es-
sential that G20 economies adopt enhanced and new policies that go
beyond the current NDC targets, so that their combined mitigation ef-
fect leads to global emission levels that are needed to limit global
warming to well below 2 °C and possible to below 1.5 °C. Sub-national
actors such as cities and regional governments may take further action,
and non-state actors can also help to overachieve NDCs.
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Appendix A. Historical emissions data sources
Historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data was taken from latest inventories, many of which have been submitted to the UNFCCC in 2017.
For Annex I Parties of the G20 (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the United States) and the
European Union, the GHG emissions data for 1990–2015 submitted via the Common Reporting Format 2018 to the UNFCCC (2018a) was used.
For historical emissions in non-Annex I Parties of the G20, for many countries the GHG emissions data was taken from the UNFCCC GHG database
(UNFCCC, 2018a), in which the GHG inventory data reported in most recent Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted to the UNFCCC (2018c) are
compiled (Table 4). For Brazil, the emissions inventory from Sistema de Estimativa de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa (SEEG, 2017) was used. For
Indonesia, the emissions data were directly taken from the first biennial report for the year 2000 and 2012, used as is, and the data of 1990–1994
from UNFCCC (2018a). Table 4 also gives the time series of data and latest reported year, which clearly shows that not always the emissions data for
the year 1990, 2010 and 2015 (needed for Fig. 1) was available. Therefore, the emissions data was extrapolated from the last reported year up to
2015 using growth rates of GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) of the EDGAR database (Olivier et al., 2017). For LULUCF emissions the same
approach was used using the data of FAO (FAOSTAT, 2018). For the historical data, the data was extrapolated from the most recent data. For
example, for China we obtained the greenhouse gas emissions China's BUR1 for 2012 (UNFCCC, 2017), and the EDGAR data was used in a similar
way to extrapolate from 2012 to 2010.
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